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MINING METADATA:
THE GOLD STANDARD FOR AUTHENTICATING
SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS
I. INTRODUCTION
From fake news1 to catfish,2 it is no wonder why social media is
perceived to be untrustworthy.3 As a result, many jurists continue to
be skeptical of social media evidence.4 The ease with which fake
profiles can be created5 and genuine profiles can be hacked poses sig-
nificant difficulty in establishing authorship of social media posts.6 Be-
cause social media is so vulnerable to exploitation, proving who
authored a communication is vital to properly authenticating social
media evidence.7 For this reason, authentication is arguably the big-
gest hurdle to admission of social media evidence.8 Authentication, or
the process of identifying an item of evidence as what the proponent
claims it to be, is a condition precedent to the admission of the evi-
1. A new poll suggests that Americans believe social media is responsible for the proliferation
of fake news. See Alex Roarty, Americans Blame Facebook for Fake News, a New Poll Finds,
MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/na
tional/article175970831.html.
2. The term “catfish” is used to describe “a person who sets up a false personal profile on a
social networking site for fraudulent or deceptive purposes.” Catfish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catfish (last updated Sept. 27, 2018).
3. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Law In The Age Of Social Media, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2016, 11:50
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2016/11/27/law-in-the-age-of-social-media/
#6d8352981db8; Allison L. Pannozzo, Note, Uploading Guilt: Adding A Virtual Records Excep-
tion to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1695 (2012).
4. Deborah Jones Merritt, Social Media, the Sixth Amendment, and Restyling: Recent Develop-
ments in the Federal Law of Evidence, 28 TOURO L. REV. 27, 51 (2012) (“The anonymity of the
internet, combined with the ephemeral nature of some communications, makes some judges
wary of accepting social media statements at face value.”); Breanne M. Democko, Comment,
Social Media and the Rules on Authentication, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 367, 369 (2012).
5. At one point, it was estimated that 83 million Facebook accounts were either duplicate or
fake accounts. Heather Kelly, 83 Million Facebook Accounts Are Fakes and Dupes, CNN (Aug.
3, 2012, 5:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/02/tech/social-media/facebook-fake-accounts/
index.html.
6. Nicole A. Keefe, Dance Like No One Is Watching, Post Like Everyone Is: The Accessibility
of “Private” Social Media Content in Civil Litigation, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1027, 1047
(2017).
7. Ira P. Robbins, Writings on the Wall: The Need for an Authorship-Centric Approach to the
Authentication of Social-Networking Evidence, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5, 29 (2012).
8. Pannozzo, supra note 3, at 1709; Paul W. Grimm et. al., Authentication of Social Media
Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 439 (2013) [hereinafter Grimm 2013].
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dence.9 This requirement “advances one of the major goals of the
rules of evidence: to ensure that, in the end, the ‘truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined.’”10 Unfortunately, the cur-
rent evidentiary rules provide little guidance and courts are divided in
their interpretation.11 Considering the increasing role social media
plays in litigation, the need for a streamlined approach is ever-
pressing.12
To illustrate, suppose the Assistant State’s Attorney has found the
smoking gun in a murder case: an inculpatory statement posted on
what appears to be the defendant’s Facebook profile.13 The problem is
that the defendant denies that she authored the statement—her ac-
count must have been hacked.14 Fortunately, Facebook records reveal
the internet protocol (IP) address of the computer used to create the
post, which is then linked to a device within the defendant’s exclusive
control.15 In this instance, metadata—the data describing the
Facebook transmission—becomes an “elegant weapon” to defeat an
otherwise irrebuttable claim.16 And unlike social media users,
metadata does not lie.17
Metadata, as distinguished from the data it describes, is “neither
created by nor normally accessible to the computer user” but is often
generated automatically as a function of the application being used.18
For instance, as a matter of practice, Facebook records metadata such
as device identifiers, device locations, mobile phone numbers, and IP
9. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a); Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 439.
10. Robbins, supra note 7, at 5 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 102).
11. Andy Radhakant & Matthew Diskin, How Social Media Are Transforming Litigation, 39
LITIG., Spring 2013, at 17, 20.
12. Pannozzo, supra note 3, at 1709; Paul W. Grimm et. al., Authenticating Digital Evidence,
69 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 55 (2017) [hereinafter Grimm 2017].
13. The illustrative example is based on the facts of People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2017).
14. Keefe, supra note 6, at 1047.
15. Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 591.
16. Brian Focht, Metadata – Elegant Weapon of a More Civilized Attorney, CYBER ADVOC.
(Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Elegant Weapon], http://www.thecyberadvocate.com/2014/11/19/
metadata/; see also John Patzakis, Judge Grimm’s Important Guidance on Social Media Evidence
Authentication, X1 DISCOVERY: EDISCOVERY LAW & TECH BLOG (July 31, 2013, 12:46 PM),
https://blog.x1discovery.com/2013/07/31/judge-grimms-important-guidance-on-social-media-evi
dence-authentication./.
17. Alan Rusbridger & Ewan MacAskill, I, Spy: Edward Snowden in Exile, GUARDIAN (July
19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-interview-rus-
bridger-macaskill.
18. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD.,
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESS-
ING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 3 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter THE SEDONA
PRINCIPLES].
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addresses associated with a user profile and the posts therein.19 There-
fore, while the evidentiary rules are still adapting in their approach to
computer-generated data, it is generally viewed as reliable.20
This Comment aims to demonstrate how using metadata can be a
reliable and efficient method of addressing the challenges in authenti-
cating social media evidence. It argues that metadata provides suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence of authorship by establishing the device,
the location from which a communication originated, or both.21 More
specifically, this Comment recommends that using metadata to au-
thenticate social media evidence should be adopted as the standard
practice in Illinois. By examining the influential cases, distilling the
guidance provided by Illinois courts, and considering how evidentiary
rules have responded to electronically stored information (ESI), this
Comment concludes that courts are not only receptive but also en-
dorse the use of metadata as a method of authentication.
This Comment begins by providing the relevant background infor-
mation, by first describing metadata and its value to litigators.22 Part
II goes on to discuss the use of social media evidence in litigation and
how courts have addressed challenges to its authenticity thus far.23
Part II concludes by outlining how social media evidence may be au-
thenticated under the rules of evidence.24 Part III provides an analysis
of how metadata can be used to address the most significant chal-
lenges associated with authenticating social media evidence: proving it
is an accurate representation of what appeared online and proving
who authored the communication in question.25 The analysis then
turns to address Illinois law specifically, demonstrating how using
metadata is the best method of authentication based on the guidance
provided by Illinois courts.26 Finally, Part IV considers the feasibility
of using metadata as the standard practice given the relevant privacy
and cost concerns.27 It outlines the collateral benefits of using
19. Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last updated Sept. 29,
2016).
20. See infra Parts II.D.1–II.D.2 and the discussion of the new federal rules; see also infra
notes 280–85 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Illinois approach to computer-generat
ed data.
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B–II.C.
24. See infra Part II.D.
25. See infra, Part III.A.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part IV.A.
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metadata, ultimately determining that it is not only a feasible but also
an efficient means of admitting social media evidence.28
II. BACKGROUND
Besides authentication, metadata has played a part in litigation
since the rise of e-discovery.29 Thanks to Edward Snowden, metadata
became the topic of everyday conversation in 2013.30 Still, it is argua-
ble whether metadata is a commonly understood term. Therefore, this
section begins by describing what metadata is and its utility in litiga-
tion. The section proceeds to acknowledge the impact social media
has on litigation and presents the challenges with authenticating it.
Next, it provides background on how courts have addressed these
challenges, followed by strategies for authenticating social media with
metadata under the rules of evidence.
A. What is Metadata?
Simply put, metadata is data about data.31 A useful analogy is the
Dewey Decimal System once used by libraries to catalog books.32 In-
formation such as the title, author, and genre contained in the card
catalog is metadata that describes a book.33 Similarly, the Exchangea-
ble Image File Format (EXIF) data embedded in a digital photograph
describes the time, date, and GPS coordinates of the photo.34 The
28. See infra Part IV.B.
29. James E. Bibart, Comment, Metadata in Digital Photography: The Need for Protection and
Production of this Silent Witness, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 792 (2016). E-discovery, which is short
for electronic discovery, is simply the term applied to the discovery of electronically stored infor-
mation. The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery & Digital Information Management
(Fourth Edition), 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 305, 323 (2014) [hereinafter Sedona Glossary] (defining e-
discovery as “[t]he process of identifying, locating, preserving, collecting, preparing, reviewing,
and producing Electronically Stored Information (ESI) in the context of the legal process.”). As
the use of ESI as evidence has become increasingly prevalent, the procedures by which attorneys
engage in discovery has necessarily adapted.
30. See Matthew Heller, Government Downplaying Sensitivity Of Metadata Collected By NSA,
MINTPRESS NEWS (June 24, 2014), http://www.mintpressnews.com/government-downplaying-
sensitivity-of-metadata-collected-by-nsa/192810/.
31. Lindsay Wise & Jonathan S. Landay, Government Could Use Metadata to Map Your Every
Move, MIAMI HERALD (June 20, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article195264
4.html.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Heidi Redlitz, Your Online Photos Can Expose Your Private Data. Here’s How to Stop It,
TRUTHFINDER (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.truthfinder.com/infomania/safety/remove-exif-data-
geotag/. Not all photos posted online reveal GPS location information as this feature can be
disabled and some—but not all—social media sites strip EXIF data from uploaded photos. Chris
Hoffman, How to See Exactly Where a Photo Was Taken (and Keep Your Location Private),
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metadata contained in a social media post varies by platform,35 but
generally, it reveals how, when, and where a user posted to her ac-
count.36 For instance, Facebook collects information about the com-
puters and smartphones used to access its services, including device
identifiers, location information, IP addresses,37 and mobile num-
bers.38 Such information could then be used to identify the originator
of a social media post by linking the particular computer to the person
who had access to it at the specific time and place.39
Metadata has proven useful to litigants in other ways. Most preva-
lently, metadata is used to facilitate the discovery of ESI.40 Metadata
is valuable when utilized by e-discovery technology to search, cull, and
analyze large amounts of data more efficiently.41 For instance, times-
tamps can be used to identify the data pertinent to the particular time
period in question.42 Likewise, location data can be used to identify
the data originating from the scene of the accident.43 Metadata is es-
sential to the de-duplication process whereby excess copies of a file
are excluded from the dataset.44
HOW-TO GEEK (May 17, 2017), https://www.howtogeek.com/211427/how-to-see-exactly-where-a-
photo-was-taken-and-keep-your-location-private/.
35. Elegant Weapon, supra note 16 (listing the metadata available from several platforms).
36. Brian Focht, Metadata Is Key to Getting the “Whole Truth” from Social Media, CYBER
ADVOC. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.thecyberadvocate.com/2015/01/14/metadata-is-key-to-whole-
truth-in-social-media/.
37. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are assigned to every computer on the internet. Tim
Fisher, What Is an IP Address?: Definition of IP Address and Why All Computers and Devices
Need One, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-ip-address-2625920 (last updated
Sept. 5, 2018). Just like license plates, IP addresses are unique serial numbers used for identifica-
tion. Id.
38. Data Policy, supra note 19. Facebook’s data policy expressly states that it will “access,
preserve and share your information . . . [i]n response to a legal request (like a search warrant,
court order or subpoena) if [it has] a good faith belief that the law requires [it] to do so.” Data
Policy, supra note 19. Whether a warrant or subpoena is required depends on a number of
considerations governed by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2012),
and the operation the third-party doctrine as limited by the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpen-
ter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). See infra Part IV.A.
39. Richard S. Kling et al., Admissibility of Social Media Evidence in Illinois, 105 ILL. B.J. 38,
41 (2017).
40. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommen-
dations, & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1,
170 (2018).
41. Id.
42. Tom Turner, How Metadata Can Affect a Case, TODAY’S GEN. COUNS., June/July 2014.
43. See Mark D. Hansen & Tyler J. Pratt, Follow the Audit Trail: The Impact of Metadata in
Litigation, DEF. COUNS. J., July 2017, at 3, 6.
44. Sedona Glossary, supra note 29, at 319. De-duplication is typically achieved by calculating
a file’s hash value using a mathematical algorithm. Sedona Glossary, supra note 29, at 319. Be-
cause hash values are unique to the file, if file Y were to return the same hash value as file X,
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Sometimes, metadata bears directly on the merits of a case.45 Not
surprisingly, metadata is “smoking gun” evidence in a claim for negli-
gent spoliation of evidence.46 This is because computer forensic tech-
nicians can use metadata to detect manipulation47 and metadata can
reveal activity associated with records the user believed to be de-
leted.48 Metadata has become increasingly relevant in medical mal-
practice suits because of its utility in creating an audit trail of the
patient’s medical records.49 It is also indispensable in trucking litiga-
tion, where Event Data Recorders that log driver reaction times
through braking, acceleration, and vehicle movement data are com-
pared to cell phone use.50 The increasing use of metadata in litigation
is not surprising given the prevalent use of ESI, and especially social
media, in litigation.51
B. Social Media in Litigation
Not only does social media usage form the basis of many lawsuits
and criminal prosecutions today, but it is also often outcome determi-
native.52 There are many examples of instances where criminal de-
fendants have posted inculpatory pictures or admissions.53 On the
other hand, a criminal defendant may offer social media posts to
prove the victim was the first aggressor.54 In the civil context, social
media provides evidence of torts such as harassment and defama-
then file X and Y are identical copies and only one of them need be retained. For more informa-
tion on hash values, see notes 151–157 and accompanying text infra.
45. The Sedona Conference, supra note 40, at 170.
46. Turner, supra note 42. Illinois law has recognized a cause of action for negligent spoliation
where a defendant has breached her duty to preserve evidence. While there is no general duty to
preserve evidence, such a duty “may arise through an agreement, a contract, a statute or another
special circumstance.” Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270–71 (Ill. 1995) (internal
citations omitted).
47. Michael J. Hannon, An Increasingly Important Requirement: Authentication of Digital Evi-
dence, 70 J. MO. B. 314, 318 (2014).
48. Turner, supra note 42, at 21.
49. See Hansen & Pratt, supra note 43, at 4.
50. Hansen & Pratt, supra note 43, at 6.
51. Hannon, supra note 47, at 319.
52. Justin P. Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in Government Investiga-
tions and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New Legal Issues, 19 RICHMOND J.L. TECH., no. 3,
2013, at 11, 28; see also Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 437–38.
53. See infra Part II.C; see, e.g., United States v. Lewisbey, 843 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2016)
(illustrating how inculpatory Facebook photos showing the defendant with lots of guns and large
sums of money provided conclusive evidence of guilt in a criminal prosecution for gun
trafficking).
54. See, e.g., People v. Nunn, No. 3–14–0137, 2016 WL 2866361 at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. May 16,
2016).
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tion.55 It may prove useful in defending against personal injury and
workers’ compensation suits.56 Furthermore, the use of social media
has become exceedingly prevalent in family law.57 More generally, on-
line profiles are treasure troves of personal information that provide
excellent fodder for impeachment on cross-examination, especially
given the level of candor on social media.58
But social media evidence is susceptible to a host of evidentiary
challenges, including authenticity, relevancy, hearsay, and best evi-
dence.59 Arguably, the most confounding of these issues is authentic-
ity.60 The authentication of social media evidence can be
accomplished under the traditional rules; however, their application
presents difficulty in two respects.61 First, vulnerability to hackers and
even innocent alteration since the original post raises potential doubts
as to whether the evidence is an accurate representation of the social
media content.62 Second, proving authorship is complicated by the
fact that social media communications are stored on remote servers,
are ephemeral and collaborative in nature, and are vulnerable to ma-
nipulation and fabrication.63 Although there are many methods for
authenticating social media evidence, there is no consensus among ju-
risdictions.64 This confusion gives rise to arguments of error on appeal
and leaves lawyers vulnerable to malpractice actions.65
C. Caselaw to Date
State cases that address the authentication of social media evidence
essentially fall into two camps: the Maryland approach or the Texas
approach.66 Skeptical of social media, the Maryland approach imposes
a heightened standard for admitting evidence.67 Under this approach,
proponents must affirmatively disprove the possibility that someone
55. Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords, 31
MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 193 (2012).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Radhakant & Diskin, supra note 11, at 18–19.
59. Pannozzo, supra note 3, at 1698.
60. Id.
61. David I. Schoen, The Authentication of Social Media Postings, 19 TRIAL EVIDENCE, May
17, 2011, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Kling et al., supra note 39, at 40.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Wendy Angus-Anderson, Authenticity and Admissibility of Social Media Website
Printouts, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 33, 37 (2015).
67. Id.
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other than the putative author created the social media content.68 By
contrast, under the Texas approach, once the proponent has made a
prima facie showing of authorship, the burden shifts to the objecting
party to prove a third-party created the content.69 After examining
these two approaches, this section follows up by highlighting influen-
tial federal cases, before turning to Illinois precedent.
1. The Maryland Approach
The Maryland approach was first articulated in Griffin v. State.70 In
Griffin, the State sought to admit printouts from a Myspace profile
allegedly belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend to prove that she had
threatened another witness.71 The profile contained her birthdate, lo-
cation, a photograph of the couple, and a caption: “FREE BOOZY!!!
JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW
WHO YOU ARE!!”72 The intermediate appellate court found that
the photograph, location, and birthdate provided sufficient circum-
stantial indicia of reliability.73 The Maryland Court of Appeals, the
highest court in the State, found that the lower court failed to consider
the possibility that another user could have created the profile or writ-
ten the “snitches get stitches” comment and thus, held the printouts
were inadequately authenticated.74
The court reasoned that the “potential for abuse and manipulation
of a social networking site by someone other than its purported crea-
tor” calls for a higher degree of scrutiny.75 The court then identified
three means by which social media evidence could be properly au-
thenticated: (1) asking the putative author to admit to creating the
content at issue; (2) examining the internet history and hard drive of
the computer of the putative author; or (3) obtaining information di-
rectly from the social network provider that links the profile and its
content to its alleged creator.76
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011); Angus-Anderson, supra note 66, at 37.
71. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 423.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 424.
76. Id. at 428.
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2. The Texas Approach
The more lenient Texas approach was first articulated by Tienda v.
State.77 Similar to Griffin, the State in Tienda introduced printouts of
three Myspace profiles belonging to the defendant.78 The profiles con-
tained numerous photographs of the defendant displaying his unique
gang-affiliated tattoos, several boastful references to the shooting in
question, and a link to the music played at the victim’s funeral.79 Ad-
ditionally, the State offered “subscriber reports” and accompanying
affidavits subpoenaed from Myspace.80 According to the subscriber
reports, the accounts were registered to email addresses containing
the defendant’s name or widely-known nickname.81
In a footnote, the court noted that the subscriber reports also con-
tained the IP addresses associated with each account.82 However, no
testimony was elicited as to whether these IP addresses corresponded
to a device belonging to the defendant or to which he had access.83
Recognizing that the State had failed to utilize any authentication
method described in Griffin,84 the court nevertheless held that the
profiles were sufficiently authenticated via circumstantial evidence.85
The court distinguished Griffin, finding that the numerous photo-
graphs portraying the distinctive features of the defendant and de-
tailed knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the shooting were
enough to justify admission.86 Although there is some disagreement as
to whether the Maryland or Texas approach is more effective,87 both
Griffin and Tienda contemplate using metadata provided by social
media companies.88
77. 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Angus-Anderson, supra note 66, at 41.
78. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 634–35.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 645.
81. Id. at 635.
82. Id. at 635 n.4.
83. Id.
84. The Tienda court observed that the first method offered in Griffin, asking the user to
admit they created the social media profile or authored the content therein, was simply not
viable when the purported author is a criminal defendant. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 647.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 456 (“The approach adopted by [Texas] is better rea-
soned, as it affords appropriate deference to the interplay between the evidence rules that gov-
ern the admissibility of social media evidence . . . .”).
88. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 647.
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3. Federal Precedent
Neither case was the first to consider metadata as a method of au-
thentication. Any discussion of the caselaw concerning the authentica-
tion of social media evidence would be remiss without mentioning the
“godfather of all cases,” Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Com-
pany.89 Lorraine is recognized as an exhaustive guide on the admissi-
bility of ESI evidence.90 The opinion was written by the Honorable
Paul Grimm, who is now considered to be “the leading jurist on [the]
subject.”91 The oft-cited decision explains how several evidentiary
rules are properly applied to ESI.92 In Lorraine, Judge Grimm identi-
fied metadata as “a useful tool for authenticating electronic records by
use of distinctive characteristics.”93 Since then, several other federal
cases have specifically examined the use of metadata to authenticate
social media evidence.
For instance, in United States v. Hassan the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling that Facebook pages and YouTube videos
were properly authenticated.94 First, the district court ruled that the
pages and videos were self-authenticating as business records based
on certifications of record custodians at Facebook and Google.95 Sec-
ond, the court found the prosecution successfully linked the pages to
the defendants by tracking the Facebook accounts to the defendants’
mailing addresses via IP addresses.96
By contrast, in United States v. Browne the Third Circuit disagreed
with the Hassan court that Facebook chat logs could be self-authenti-
cated as business records.97 Although the Facebook record custodian
confirmed that the communications took place between certain
Facebook accounts on particular dates and times, the court required
evidence that the defendant authored such communications.98 None-
theless, the court recognized that by obtaining the logs directly from
89. 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007); Ed Finkel, Building Your Case with Social Media Evidence,
102 ILL. B.J. 276, 279 (2014).
90. Democko, supra note 4, at 395.
91. Hannon, supra note 47, at 314.
92. See Democko, supra note 4, at 380; Siri Carlson, When Is A Tweet Not an Admissible
Tweet? Closing the Authentication Gap in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1033, 1065 (2016). According to Westlaw, Lorraine has been cited by 185 cases and in many
jurisdictions (last viewed Oct. 31, 2018).
93. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 548.
94. United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
98. Id. Ultimately the court found that the government had otherwise produced enough cir-
cumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find the chat records authentic. Id. at 413.
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Facebook, along with a certificate attesting to their maintenance by
automated systems, the Government bolstered confidence in their
accuracy.99
The Second Circuit declined to opine as to “what kind of evidence
would have been sufficient to authenticate the [social media] page and
warrant its consideration by the jury” in United States v. Vayner.100
The court instructed that “[t]he bar for authentication of evidence is
not particularly high” and “[t]he proponent need not rule out all pos-
sibilities inconsistent with authenticity.”101 The court held that al-
though the defendant’s name, photograph, and some details about
him were present on the page, this information was insufficient evi-
dence that the defendant created the page.102 The court’s pronounce-
ment that something beyond biographical information is required,
while at the same time acknowledging that conclusive proof is not re-
quired, has been influential to other courts.103
4. Illinois Precedent
The Illinois Appellate Court relied heavily on Vayner when it de-
cided its seminal case “addressing the admissibility of a Facebook post
allegedly attributable to a criminal defendant.”104 In People v. Kent,
the Illinois Appellate Court hinted in dicta that an IP address might
have been sufficient to authenticate the Facebook post in question.105
The State offered a screenshot of a Facebook page containing a photo-
graph resembling the defendant, the defendant’s name and nickname,
and a post stating, “its my way or the highway . . . . . leave em dead n
his driveway.”106 The trial court admitted the post based on the State’s
claim that Facebook records would reveal that the post was associated
with an IP address belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend.107 How-
99. Id. at 415–16.
100. 769 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 130 (quoting United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007)).
102. Id. at 132 (“[T]here was no evidence that [the defendant] himself had created the page or
was responsible for its contents.”).
103. See People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“[W]e conclude that United
States v. Vayner . . . best represents a line of cases that is on point and persuasive.”) (internal
citation omitted); Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 714 (Md. 2015) (“[W]e find succor in the stan-
dard articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v.
Vayner.”).
104. Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 592.
105. Id. at 595.
106. Id. at 591.
107. Id.
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ever, the State failed to produce any extrinsic evidence of authorship
at trial.108
As a result, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the verdict.109 The
court held that “more than a ‘simple name and photograph’” is
needed to sufficiently link the communication to the putative au-
thor.110 Although the court refrained from deciding the specific type
and quantum of evidence necessary to authenticate a Facebook post,
it referred to the examples provided in Tienda for guidance.111 Among
these were:
[B]usiness records of an internet service provider or cell phone
company show[ing] that the communication originated from the
purported sender’s personal computer or cell phone under circum-
stances in which it is reasonable to believe that only the purported
sender would have had access to the computer or cell phone.112
The court went on to observe that allowing the prosecution “to argue
that the Facebook post was tantamount to an admission” without
“‘some basis’ on which a reasonable juror could conclude that the
post was not just any Internet post, but was in fact created by defen-
dant or at his direction” was not harmless, but reversible error.113
On the other hand, in a previous unpublished opinion, another Illi-
nois Appellate Court ruled that it was reversible error to exclude a
Facebook printout proffered by a criminal defendant.114 In People v.
Nunn, the trial court allowed the defendant to testify about the
Facebook messages exchanged between himself and the victim but re-
fused to admit printouts of the same.115 The defense aimed to use the
Facebook messages to support its theory of the case and its self-de-
fense claim: that the defendant met with the victims to sell them a gun,
rather than to rob them during a drug deal.116 Although the court
ruled that the Facebook messages could be authenticated, it ultimately
sided with the State in deciding that the printout was evidence of a
collateral matter and thus was not relevant.117
The appellate court disagreed, finding that the Facebook messages
“pertained to defendant’s state of mind and intent, an essential ele-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 599.
110. Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (quoting Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424, 433
(Miss. 2014)).
111. Id. at 598–99.
112. Id. at 598 (quoting Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433).
113. Id. at 599 (internal quotations omitted).
114. People v. Nunn, No. 3–14–0137, 2016 WL 2866361 at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. May 16, 2016).
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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ment of the underlying charges and defendant’s claim of self-de-
fense.”118 The court held that because “[t]he printout was arguably the
most probative evidence available on that issue—even more probative
tha[n] the defendant’s own testimony”—it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to exclude it.119 Thus, consistent with the court’s
ruling in Kent, the Nunn court considered an error regarding the ad-
missibility of social media evidence attributable to a criminal defen-
dant dispositive on the verdict.120
Most recently, an Illinois Appellate Court again considered the ad-
missibility of Facebook messages, but this time under the rules for
hearsay.121 In People v. Maya, the appellate court upheld the admis-
sion of Facebook messages under the business records exception.122
Similar to its federal analog, the business record exception under Illi-
nois Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides that records kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity are admissible with a certifi-
cate of authenticity from the record custodian.123 In Maya, the certifi-
cate attested to the fact that the messages were recorded by the
automated systems of Facebook in the regular course of business and
as a matter of practice, and thus complied with requirements for self-
authentication under Rule 902(11).124 Although the defendant in
Maya did not directly challenge the authenticity of the messages by
denying authorship, its precedential value is unmistaken: Illinois
courts are willing to consider Facebook records as self-authenticating.
Putting aside Nunn and Maya, when you consider Kent and the
other cases surveyed above, they all agree on one thing: proving au-
thorship is the key to authenticating a social media post.125 Whether
Illinois decides to adopt the more permissive Texas approach followed
by federal courts,126 or resolves to apply a heightened standard of
proof for social media authenticity, metadata can be useful in proving
authorship.127
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id. at *8.
120. Nunn, 2016 WL 2866361 at *9.
121. People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
122. Id. at 30–31.
123. Ill. R. Evid. Rule 803(6).
124. Maya, 88 N.E.3d at 30–31.
125. Robbins, supra note 7, at 30.
126. Panel Discussion, Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1163, 1178 (2014) (agreeing that the federal cases apply the Texas approach because it is
more consistent with the low threshold established by Rule 901(a)).
127. John Patzakis, Overcoming Potential Legal Challenges to the Authentication of Social Me-
dia Evidence, FORENSIC FOCUS (Apr. 2. 2012) [hereinafter FORENSIC FOCUS], https://articles.
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D. How to Prove the Authenticity of Social Media Evidence
As the cases discussed above suggest, metadata can provide suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence of authenticity.128 But demonstrating
how metadata can be used for authentication necessitates discussion
of the pertinent evidentiary rules. Social media, and ESI generally,
can be authenticated under the traditional rules of authentication.129
Recently, however, new federal rules have been enacted to include
machine-generated data and copies of ESI as self-authenticating.130
This section first discusses how to use metadata to authenticate social
media under the traditional federal rules, especially Rule 901(b)(4), as
distinctive characteristics. Second, this section describes how the new
federal rules might be applied to metadata before discussing how Illi-
nois approaches computer-generated data. Finally, it observes the im-
portance of conditional relevance under Rule 104(b).
1. Metadata as Distinctive Characteristics under Rule 901(b)(4)
Rule 901(b)(4) provides that authentication can be accomplished
via its distinctive characteristics including, but not limited to, “the ap-
pearance, contents, substance, [or] internal patterns . . . of the item,
taken together with all the circumstances.”131 In addition to basic bio-
graphical information and photographs included on the face of a so-
cial media page, the associated metadata are also distinct
characteristics that can be used to establish authenticity.132 Metadata
harvested from a Facebook post can provide information such as the
timestamp and unique identification numbers of the post, the author,
and the account associated with it.133 Uploaded photographs, tweets,
forensicfocus.com/2012/04/02/overcoming-potential-legal-challenges-to-the-authentication-of-so-
cial-media-evidence/.
128. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 548 (D. Md. 2007) (“[M]etadata cer-
tainly is a useful tool for authenticating electronic records by use of distinctive characteristics.”);
Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011) (suggesting that basic subscriber information can be
used to link the author to the profile); People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578, 598–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
(suggesting, in dicta, that Facebook records would have been sufficient for authentication).
129. See generally Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1180 (discussing whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence should be revised to address digital evidence).
130. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(13); Fed. R. Evid. 902(14).
131. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4); Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(4). Subsection 4 of Rule 901(b) is identical
under Illinois and Federal law.
132. FORENSIC FOCUS, supra note 127.
133. John Patzakis, Key Facebook Metadata Fields Lawyers and eDiscovery Professionals
Need to be Aware of, X1 DISCOVERY: EDISCOVERY LAW & TECH BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011), https://
blog.x1discovery.com/2011/10/11/key-facebook-metadata-fields-lawyers-and-ediscovery-profes
sionals-need-to-be-aware-of/.
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and Snapchat geofilters may even include location information.134 Ad-
ditionally, the metadata collected and stored by social network prov-
iders like Facebook includes the IP address or mobile device identifier
from which a post originated.135 Taken together, this information pro-
vides circumstantial evidence of authenticity.136
Of course, metadata is not the only method of authenticating social
media evidence.137 Other distinct characteristics of the content such as
the vernacular used or inside information known only to the pur-
ported author can also be used as circumstantial evidence of author-
ship.138 Authentication can also be achieved via Rule 901(b)(1)139 by
testimony of the purported author, testimony of a witness that saw the
purported author publish the post, or testimony from a witness that
often communicated with the author via the account connected with
the post.140 Expert testimony could be used to describe the security
features of a particular social networking site, or if available, the re-
sults of a search of the account holder’s computer hard drive.141
Additionally, if somehow authorship is not at issue, authentication
can be accomplished under Rule 901(b)(9), which allows evidence
describing a system or process producing reliable results.142 The
“Wayback Machine,” a service developed by an organization called
the Internet Archive, provides litigants with screenshots of web con-
tent as it appeared on a particular date and time.143 Traditionally,
courts have required a witness from the Internet Archive to testify as
134. See Hoffman, supra note 34; John Patzakis, Key Twitter Metadata Fields Lawyers and
eDiscovery Professionals Need to be Aware of, X1 DISCOVERY: EDISCOVERY LAW & TECH BLOG
(Oct. 6, 2011), https://blog.x1discovery.com/2011/10/06/key-twitter-metadata-fields-lawyers-and-
ediscovery-professionals-need-to-be-aware-of/; Patrick Ciapciak, Selfies in Court: Snapchat As
Admissible Evidence, 2017 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., Feb. 7, 2017, at 1, 3–4, https://
bciptf.org/2017/02/selfies-in-court-snapchat-as-admissible-evidence/. “[G]eofilters let mobile
users add a location illustration—specific to where they are by city, neighborhood, or even
store—to photos that they may then share with friends or followers via Snapchat.” Lauryn
Chamberlain, GeoMarketing 101: What Are Geofilters?, GEOMARKETING (Mar. 2, 2016, 2:28
PM), https://geomarketing.com/geomarketing-101-what-are-geofilters.
135. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 247–267.
137. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 32 (containing a more exhaustive list); see also Grimm
2013, supra note 8, at 469.
138. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 32; see also Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 469.
139. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1); Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).
140. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 32.
141. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 32.
142. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9); Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(9); Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 470.
143. See About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE WAYBACK MACHINE, https://
archive.org/web/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2018); Specht v. Google Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 580
(N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 747 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2014).
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to the accuracy of the process used to retrieve the screenshot.144 But
some courts have gone so far as to take judicial notice of the reliability
of the Wayback Machine.145 The utility of the Wayback Machine is
particularly relevant due to the fleeting nature of social media con-
tent.146 In particular, one of the defining features of Snapchat, a mo-
bile application that shares photographs and videos, is the automatic
deletion of “snaps.”147 However, at least one digital forensic company
is capable of retrieving snaps that have already been deleted.148 But
authenticity may still be an issue if the accuracy of the retrieved copy
cannot be verified.149 Snapchat users may also take screenshots to
save snaps, and these images are easily edited and reproduced.150
Copies of ESI such as retrieved snaps have also been subject to au-
thenticity challenges. Here too, metadata, in the form of hash values,
provides a distinguishing characteristic that can be used to establish
the accuracy of a copy.151 Running a hash algorithm against the con-
tents of a file will generate a unique numerical value, known as a hash
value.152 Hash values are so distinctive that it is mathematically cer-
tain that no two files will have the same hash signature unless their
content is identical.153 Just as a Bates stamp functions as a method of
providing each paper document with a unique identification number,
hash values are inserted into a file to function as an electronic Bates
stamp.154 Even the slightest change to the content—something as in-
significant as removing a space—will alter the hash signature.155 Veri-
fying authenticity using hash values has usually required expert
testimony.156 However, as of December 1, 2017, certified copies of
ESI are self-authenticating under the new federal rules.157
144. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 27 n.80 (2017); see, e.g., Specht, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
145. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 37 n.131; Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1189.
146. FORENSIC FOCUS, supra note 127.
147. “Snaps” are photographs or videos captured and shared via the application. Ciapciak,
supra note 134, at 1.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546 (D. Md. 2007).
152. Hannon, supra note 47, at 318.
153. Id. The odds that two distinct data sets will have the same hash signature is less than one
in a billion. Zachary Rosenberg, Returning to Plato’s Cave: Metadata’s Shadows in the Court-
room, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 452 (2016).
154. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546–547.
155. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452. Depending on the type, a change in the metadata will
also affect the hash value. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452.
156. Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1197.
157. Fed. R. Evid. 902(14).
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2. The New Federal Rules
The 2017 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence included
two new subdivisions to the list of evidence that is self-authenticating
under Rule 902.158 Rule 902 now provides:
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require
no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:
. . .
(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or Sys-
tem. A record generated by an electronic process or system that
produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a quali-
fied person that complies with the certification requirements of
Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice re-
quirements of Rule 902(11).
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Me-
dium, or File. Data copied from an electronic device, storage me-
dium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital identification,
as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with
the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The propo-
nent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).159
These new rules were established to streamline the authentication of
certain kinds of digital evidence that would likely be authenticated by
witness testimony under 901(b)(1) anyway.160 The Advisory Commit-
tee on Evidence (Advisory Committee) recognized that the authentic-
ity of machine-generated information and copies of electronic files are
rarely the subjects of a legitimate dispute, and the Advisory Commit-
tee sought to avoid the expense and inconvenience associated with
calling an authentication witness.161 Instead of testifying live, a custo-
dian could attest to the accuracy of the record by signing a certificate;
this process is known as certification. By allowing authentication via
certification, the parties are forced to confront questions of authentic-
ity before trial rather than scrambling to line up a witness that be-
comes unnecessary once the opposing party stipulates to authenticity
at trial.162 The certification process shifts the burden of going forward
(not the burden of proof) on authenticity questions to the opponent of
158. Fed. R. Evid. 902(13); Fed. R. Evid. 902(14).
159. Fed R. Evid. 902.
160. Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Reporter’s Memorandum on Possible Amend-
ments to Rule 902 for Authenticating Machine-Generated Data and Electronic Information
Through Hash Value to Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, at 210–16 (Oct. 24, 2014)
[hereinafter Reporter’s Memorandum], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/
EV2014-10.pdf.
161. Id.
162. Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee’s note to the 2017 amendment.
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the evidence, who is given fair notice and opportunity to challenge the
certificate and the underlying record.163
It is important to note that these new rules do not change the stan-
dards for authenticating ESI, only the manner by which a proponent
may establish their authenticity.164 The certificate is only a substitute
for live testimony and must contain information sufficient for authen-
tication as if that information was provided by a witness at trial.165
Furthermore, the certificate is only a means of satisfying the require-
ments of authentication, and the opponent is free to challenge its ad-
missibility on other grounds—it does not automatically meet the
requirements of the Rule 803(6) hearsay exception.166 To illustrate,
Rule 902(13) would provide for the authentication of a webpage col-
lected by the Wayback Machine via a certificate attesting to the accu-
racy of the process used to retrieve it.167 It would not prove that the
defendant was the author of the statement contained therein.168
Therefore, while these new rules certainly streamline the process of
authenticating certain digital evidence, they do not ultimately resolve
one of the central issues concerning social media evidence—proving
authorship.
3. Authentication as a Business Record & Illinois Rules for
Computer-Generated Data
The Illinois Rules of Evidence provide that records kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity may be considered
self-authenticating when they comply with the requirements of Rules
803(6) and 902(11).169 However, Illinois imposes additional common-
law requirements for computer-generated records beyond the require-
ments of the business record exception:170
[A] proper foundation additionally requires a showing that standard
equipment was used; the particular computer generates accurate
records when used appropriately; the computer was used appropri-
ately; and the sources of information, the method of recording uti-
163. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 211.
164. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 40.
165. Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee’s note to the 2017 amendment.
166. Id.
167. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 210–11.
168. Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee’s note to the 2017 amendment.
169. Ill. R. Evid. Rule 803(6); Ill. R. Evid. Rule 902(11); See also People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d
10, 30–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
170. People v. Nixon, 36 N.E.3d 349, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
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lized, and the time of preparation indicate that the record is
trustworthy and should be admitted into evidence.171
Satisfying these requirements can be accomplished by a witness with
knowledge.172 Whether or not such testimony must occur live is unde-
termined.173 In criminal cases, the witnesses have testified live, but in
a civil case the court found that an affidavit submitted with the sum-
mary judgment motion satisfied the requirements.174
4. The Importance of Conditional Relevance under Rule 104(b)
While Maya provides the means to authenticate metadata as a busi-
ness record under Rule 902(11), whether such a record is enough to
support a prima facie case of authorship is still an open question.175
There is a debate over whether authorship must be determined prior
to admission or whether questions of authorship are properly deter-
mined by the fact-finder.176 Unfortunately, it is unclear where Illinois
law falls on the issue.177 Further discussion on the relationship be-
tween Rule 104 and the rules on authentication is necessary.178
Rule 104(a) provides that “[p]reliminary questions concerning . . .
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court” and
thus imposes on a judge the gatekeeping function of determining what
evidence should be presented to the jury.179 Authenticity is one rele-
vant consideration.180 But determining the authenticity of social me-
dia evidence might depend on a question of fact, specifically, who
authored the post in question.181 Such questions of fact are appropri-
ately submitted to the jury, otherwise “the functioning of the jury as a
trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually
171. Id. (quoting People v. Universal Pub. Transp., Inc., 974 N.E.2d 251, 262 (Ill. App. Ct.
2012)).
172. See People v. Lopez, No. 1-15-0167, 2016 WL 3202022 at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); see also
Nixon, 36 N.E.3d at 369; People v. Morrow, 628 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
173. See infra Part IV.C and its discussion of whether business and computer-generated
records may be admitted with a certificate of authenticity without violating a criminal defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
174. Compare Lopez, 2016 WL 3202022 at *3 and Morrow, 628 N.E.2d at 555, with US Bank,
Nat’l Ass’n v. Avdic, 10 N.E.3d 339, 349–50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
175. The defendant in Maya challenged the Facebook records as inadmissible hearsay rather
than denying authorship of the messages in question. People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 30–31 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2017).
176. Robbins, supra note 7, at 20.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 186–88.
178. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 5. It should be noted that Judge Grimm discusses the
Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than the Illinois Rules of Evidence. Compare Fed. R. Evid.
104 with Ill. R. Evid. 104.
179. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a); Ill. R. Evid. 104(a); Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1175.
180. Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1175.
181. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 6.
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destroyed.”182 Because the jury, as fact-finder, must first determine
whether the evidence is authentic before it becomes relevant, the evi-
dence is said to be “conditionally relevant.” Rule 104(b) provides for
situations where the relevance of evidence depends on the fulfillment
of a condition, or in other words, it depends on the establishment of a
fact.183
Under Illinois law “the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfill-
ment of the condition.”184 Although the language is mandatory, as
compared to Federal Rule 104(b),185 the Illinois Rule leaves room for
discretion as to whether the evidence shall be admitted upon produc-
tion of proof, or whether the proposed evidence is admitted subject to
the condition that proof will be presented to the jury at trial.186 The
difference is significant considering that when a judge admits evidence
subject to condition, there is a possibility that sufficient proof of au-
thenticity will never be presented at trial, and then, as the saying goes,
the bell cannot be unrung.187 When Illinois Rule 104 is applied to Peo-
ple v. Kent, it is unclear whether the error occurred when the trial
court preliminarily determined that the Facebook post would be ad-
mitted subject to the condition that Facebook records would be
presented to the jury.188 Or the error may have occurred at trial,
where the defense’s objection to an inadequate foundation should
have been sustained because the State failed to produce the promised
Facebook records.189 It is unclear from the appellate court’s decision
when exactly the error occurred.190 Regardless, the result is the same.
So why does it matter? Suppose that the State had produced
records showing that the post originated from the defendant’s girl-
friend’s IP address.191 The defense objects on the basis that anyone
with access to her computer could have authored the post because the
182. Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) advisory committee’s note to the 1972 amendment. Contra Robbins,
supra note 7, at 20 (“Leaving the fact-finder, often a jury, to consider potentially untrustworthy
evidence is precisely what the court’s role as gatekeeper is designed to prevent.”).
183. Ill. R. Evid. 104(b). For instance, the relevance of the Facebook post in Kent, turned on
whether the prosecution could show that it was attributable to the defendant. People v. Kent, 81
N.E.3d 578, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
184. Ill. R. Evid. 104(b).
185. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) provides that “the court may admit the proposed evi-
dence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.” Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) (emphasis
added).
186. Ill. R. Evid. 104(b).
187. See, e.g., Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 591.
188. Id. at 595.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Id.
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defendant never logs out of his account.192 In this scenario, the trial
judge could have admitted the Facebook post without error under
Rule 104(a).193 Contrary to the heightened standard required under
the Maryland approach,194 Rule 104 does not require the proponent
to prove a negative—that no one but the defendant could have au-
thored the Facebook post.195 Instead, the burden is the same low
threshold imposed by Rule 901(a), requiring only “evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.”196 As a distinctive characteristic, metadata offers strong cir-
cumstantial evidence satisfying the requirements of Rule 901(b)(4),197
and the defense’s alternate theory of authorship could be argued
against the reliability of the evidence.198
But consider another hypothetical, where the defendant introduces
contradictory evidence to refute authorship of the post in question.199
This scenario implicates Rule 104(b), where the relevance of the
Facebook post is dependent on whether the defense’s version of the
facts is enough to dissuade the jury that the defendant authored the
post.200 Opponents argue that conditionally admitting social media ev-
idence under Rule 104(b) will punt all reliability concerns with social
media to the fact-finder, thereby effectively shirking the judge’s gate-
keeper role.201 However, before allowing the jury to consider the po-
tentially admissible evidence, the judge must still make a threshold
determination that a reasonable jury could find the evidence authen-
tic.202 Furthermore, this criticism confuses the distinction between ad-
missibility and determining what weight to assign to the evidence.203
With the proper instruction, the jury would be weighing the compet-
ing evidence of authorship to determine admissibility, rather than the
weight of the evidence itself.204 Notes from the Advisory Committee
192. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing a similar hypothetical).
193. See Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 595 (indicating that evidence linking the post to the girlfriend’s IP
address would have provided circumstantial evidence of authenticity); see also Grimm 2017,
supra note 12, at 8 (discussing a similar hypothetical).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 66–67.
195. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 8. Judge Grimm and company argue that social media
evidence would never be authenticated “if ‘it might have been hacked’ or ‘it might have been
photoshopped’ were enough to preclude authentication.” Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 8.
196. Ill. R. Evid. 901(a).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 132–36.
198. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 8.
199. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 9.
200. See Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 9.
201. Robbins, supra note 7, at 20.
202. Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1176.
203. Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1178.
204. Panel Discussion, supra note 126, at 1176; see also Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 9–10.
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also suggest that a judge may withdraw evidence from the jury’s con-
sideration if the proponent ultimately fails to meet the 901(a)
threshold.205
Thus, social media evidence is admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence without requiring the proponent to prove a negative, and
competing evidence does not prevent it from reaching the jury.206 Yet,
the ambiguity created by the language of Illinois Rule of Evidence
104(b), and left unresolved by Kent, leaves Illinois practitioners with
something to be desired: a best practice for admitting social media
evidence.207
III. ANALYSIS
As the preceding discussion on the rules of authentication demon-
strates, there are several ways to authenticate social media evi-
dence.208 So what makes using metadata the best practice? Each of
the landmark cases—Lorraine, Griffin, Tienda, and Kent—advocate
for the use of metadata as a means of authentication.209 Therefore,
regardless of the standard applied, using metadata is a viable and suc-
cessful method. Furthermore, metadata effectively counters the stan-
dard objections to social media evidence. The first part of the analysis
focuses on the ways in which metadata can be used to prove the evi-
dence presented is an accurate representation of the social media con-
tent and to prove who authored the content in question. The
argument proceeds to examine Illinois jurisprudence specifically, dis-
tilling the guidance Illinois appellate courts have provided.
However, by advocating the use of metadata as a best practice for
authentication, this Comment is not suggesting it as the rule. In some
circumstances, social media communications might be more readily
authenticated by a witness with knowledge, perhaps by the author
herself.210 But that is not always the case, especially when the pur-
ported author is a criminal defendant and will likely invoke her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.211 This Comment aims to
address circumstances where other methods of authentication are ei-
205. Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) advisory committee’s note to the 1972 amendment.
206. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 10–11.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 186–89.
208. See discussion supra Part II.D.
209. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 548 (D. Md. 2007); Griffin v. State, 19
A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); People v.
Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
210. See, e.g., People v. Nunn, No. 3–14–0137, 2016 WL 2866361 at *18 (Ill. App. Ct. May 16,
2016).
211. John G. Browning, Introducing Social Media Evidence, 74 ADVOCATE 110, 111 (2016).
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ther unavailable or ineffective. Under such circumstances, metadata
can provide the means to foreclose otherwise indefensible claims that
the social media profile is fake, hacked, or that the specific communi-
cation was posted by someone other than the page’s owner.
A. Metadata Effectively Addresses Common Authenticity
Challenges
Social media evidence is inherently vulnerable to authenticity chal-
lenges due to the dynamic and anonymous nature of internet-based
communications.212 Unlike letters or other hardcopy documents, ESI
is ephemeral and vulnerable to inadvertent alteration.213 Social media
content is considered especially suspect because of the ease with
which an account can be fraudulently created, hacked, or accessed by
a third-party.214 As a result, the two central questions in authenticat-
ing social media evidence are: (1) whether the proffered exhibit accu-
rately represents what appeared on the internet at a given time; and
(2) whether the communication can be properly attributed to the al-
leged declarant.215 Metadata effectively addresses both of these
concerns.216
1. Proving Accuracy
A social media page may appear quite different from one day to the
next depending on the owner’s desire to update or delete its con-
tents.217 The ephemeral nature of social media urges litigants to cap-
ture a screenshot218 in order to generate a static record of its contents
at a certain date and time.219 But because a screenshot is merely an
image representing the social media page,220 the proponent has the
added challenge of demonstrating that the screenshot accurately de-
212. Democko, supra note 4, at 381–82.
213. Kling et al., supra note 39, at 40.
214. Keefe, supra note 6, at 1047; see also Elizabeth A. Flanagan, #guilty? Sublet v. State and
the Authentication of Social Media Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 61 VILL. L. REV. 287, 301
(2016) (“Social media evidence presents two separate concerns regarding authentication: first,
anyone can make a profile under a fictitious name, and second, a person can access another’s
profile simply by attaining the profile’s username and password.”).
215. Democko, supra note 4, at 381–82; Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evi-
dence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 16–17 (2009); Merritt, supra note 4, at 52.
216. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 456.
217. Browning, supra note 211, at 116.
218. A screenshot is analogous to a photograph in that it depicts what was displayed on a
particular electronic device at a given point in time. Merritt, supra note 4, at 52.
219. Effective Claims Practices: Overcoming Hurdles to the Use of Social Media, HEYL, ROY-
STER, VOELKER & ALLEN (May 22, 2013) [hereinafter Effective Claims Practices], www.heyl
royster.com/_data/files/Seminar%202013/B%20-%20SKH%20-%20V6%20-%20Final.pdf.
220. Merritt, supra note 4, at 52.
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picts the page at the time it was captured.221 This requires “factual
specificity about the process by which the electronically stored infor-
mation is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without altera-
tion or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of a
system or process that does so.”222 Factual specificity about the steps
taken to collect and preserve the screenshot can be achieved through
an affidavit or a witness attestation, but metadata offers a more relia-
ble method of authentication.223 Metadata provides contextual infor-
mation as to the origins of a document, such as the date and time of its
creation.224 Rather than rely on a witness whose recollection or credi-
bility may be called into doubt, metadata can definitively establish the
date and time a screenshot was captured.225
This is not to say that metadata is immune to manipulation.226 Even
absent bad faith, metadata is highly susceptible to inadvertent altera-
tion.227 For instance, the last-accessed or last-modified timestamps
might be automatically updated each time a file is opened for view-
ing.228 But with the use of special software, digital forensic experts can
access and preserve a file without affecting the metadata and are often
able to detect when metadata has been fabricated.229 Metadata is also
quite easily stripped or “scrubbed” from a document.230 Simply con-
verting the document to a PDF version will typically remove metadata
from the file.231 Likewise, printed hard copies do not include metadata
useful for authentication.232 For this reason, printouts of social media
pages are likely insufficient to authenticate the content pictured
therein.233
221. Finkel, supra note 89, at 278; Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 457.
222. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 458 (quoting Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 545 (D. Md. 2007)).
223. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 456; see also Bibart, supra note 29, at 793 (discussing
metadata’s value in overcoming false testimony).
224. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 457.
225. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 457. Metadata is especially preferable to witness testimony
when the individual who captured the screenshot was the attorney rather than a disinterested
third-party. See Effective Claims Practices, supra note 219 (“Attorneys cannot call themselves to
the stand to testify about how they gathered this information.”).
226. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 451.
227. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 451.
228. See Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 451.
229. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 451; Bibart, supra note 29, at 794.
230. See Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452. “Scrubbing” a document, or redacting the invisi-
ble data, is typically done to protect privileged information. See Rosenberg, supra note 153, at
452.
231. See Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452.
232. Finkel, supra note 89, at 278.
233. Finkel, supra note 89, at 278.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 25  7-JAN-19 10:05
2018] AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 127
However, because metadata is highly volatile by nature, it inher-
ently provides a record of if and when an electronic document has
been modified.234 Knowing whether a file has been modified can be
important to prove or disprove tampering.235 Screenshots are particu-
larly vulnerable to such attacks due to the many ways in which tech-
nology enables users to alter digital images.236 Some courts have ruled
that absent specific proof, allegations of tampering only go to the
weight of the evidence rather than its authenticity.237 Even so, chal-
lenges to the integrity of the chain of custody are defensible using a
specific type of metadata known as a hash value.238 Hash values are
akin to fingerprints in that they uniquely identify a computer file.239
Because hash values are mathematically generated, a file’s hash signa-
ture will be the same each time the algorithm is applied.240 Therefore,
hash values can be used to verify the accuracy of a copy when com-
pared to the original file.241
The Advisory Committee specifically contemplated the mathemati-
cal reliability of hash values when it crafted the new Federal Rules of
Evidence.242 Observing that forensic examiners must work with a copy
to preserve and avoid contaminating the original,243 Rule 902(14) pro-
vides that these copies can be admitted as self-authenticating via certi-
fication of identical hash values.244 By recognizing hash values as the
234. Hannon, supra note 47, at 318–19. System metadata consists of timestamps of when the
file was “modified, accessed, and created,” otherwise known as “MAC” data. Hannon, supra
note 47, at 318–19. Because this type of metadata records the changes made to a file, it can be
useful in proving attribution and accuracy. Hannon, supra note 47, at 318–19.
235. Hannon, supra note 47, at 317.
236. Goode, supra note 215, at 19–20.
237. Hansen & Pratt, supra note 43, at 13 (collecting federal case law); Hannon, supra note 47,
at 318 (relying on Missouri and Ohio appellate decisions).
238. Hannon, supra note 47, at 318.
239. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452. Similarly, hash values have been compared to DNA.
Hannon, supra note 47, at 318.
240. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452.
241. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 452. The utility of hash values is somewhat limited when
applied to data stored on mobile devices. Hannon, supra note 47, at 320. Because such devices
are constantly powered on and continuously update, even back-to-back downloads will acquire
slightly different content and thus, distinct hash values. Hannon, supra note 47, at 320 (quoting
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, NIST Special Pub. 800-101, Guide-
lines on Mobile Device Forensics, at 26 (May 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-
101r1). But while hash values cannot be used to verify the entire data set, hash values generally
remain consistent for individual files. Hannon, supra note 47, at 320.
242. Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee’s note to the 2017 amendment; Reporter’s Memo-
randum, supra note 160, at 213.
243. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 213.
244. Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee’s note to the 2017 amendment.
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industry standard in authenticating copies,245 the new rules should as-
sist in proliferating the use of metadata in authentication generally.
2. Proving Attribution
Not only can metadata offer conclusive proof that the proffered ex-
hibit is an accurate representation, but it can also be convincing cir-
cumstantial evidence of authorship.246 The identity of the alleged
declarant is the most frequently contested authentication issue when
introducing social media evidence.247 Not surprisingly, proving attri-
bution can be a significant hurdle given the proliferation of fake
profiles and the ease with which legitimate profiles can be accessed by
third parties.248 As a result, proponents of social media evidence must
overcome challenges based on two general theories: first, that the ac-
count is fraudulent; or second, that someone besides the alleged au-
thor had access to the account.249 While other methods of
authentication might be used in rebuttal, metadata can be especially
convincing in undermining the credibility of such claims.250
First, the contextual information gleaned from metadata can go a
long way to eliminate the possibility that it is a fake account.251 While
basic biographical information and photographs containing the like-
ness of the purported author are insufficient to disprove fabrication,252
information contained in metadata can provide the link between the
profile and its alleged owner.253 Although social networking sites do
not verify owner identity, a subpoena would at least reveal the email
address used to register the account.254 And even when proxy servers,
virtual private networks (VPNs), or onion routing is used to conceal
the IP address from which a specific post originated,255 some social
245. Id.; Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 213.
246. See Hansen & Pratt, supra note 43, at 3.
247. Democko, supra note 4, at 382.
248. Flanagan, supra note 214, at 301–02.
249. Flanagan, supra note 214, at 302; Democko, supra note 4, at 382.
250. Hansen & Pratt, supra note 43, at 3.
251. Michael D. Dean, Authenticating Social Media in Evidentiary Proceedings, 28 CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2014, at 49, 50.
252. Grimm 2017, supra note 12, at 31.
253. Dean, supra note 251, at 64.
254. Dean, supra note 251, at 50, 64; Robbins, supra note 7, at 33.
255. Proxy servers act as an intermediary, forwarding a communication from the generating
computer to the recipient such that the return IP address listed is that of the proxy server rather
than the author. JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 255 (8th ed.
2018). In a virtual private network (VPN) the traffic is encrypted on its way to the proxy. Id.
Onion routing is most secure in that it “separately encrypt[s] each layer of communication: each
proxy except the last knows only that it is somewhere in the middle of a chain, and has no idea of
the contents of a message.” Id. But despite their ability to conceal the message’s originating IP
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media providers also record the device identifiers of devices used to
access the account.256 By showing that the email address attached to
the account is the same utilized by the alleged owner, the proponent
of the evidence successfully forecloses a claim that the account is
fake.257 More conclusively, by demonstrating that the alleged account
holder owns the devices used to access the account, it becomes ex-
ceedingly unlikely that this same person does not also own the profile
in question.258
Second, metadata can provide circumstantial evidence that the al-
leged declarant had control over the account during the time in ques-
tion.259 The prevalence of hacking260 means that it is not enough to
demonstrate that the alleged declarant owns the account in ques-
tion.261 Furthermore, many users remained logged in on their devices,
which means anyone could access the account simply by using an ac-
count holder’s unguarded phone or computer.262 But by using
metadata to flag the associated devices and routine IP addresses, re-
mote access by a malicious hacker would be easy to detect.263 Theo-
ries based on surreptitious access via the account holder’s own devices
are not as easily defensible; still metadata can provide sufficient con-
textual information to test the veracity of such a claim.264
For example, knowing the timestamp and GPS location at which a
social media post originated allows the proponent to establish control
by implication—thus limiting the number of potential authors to those
present at that specific time and place.265 Armed with this informa-
tion, the lawyer might use it to undermine the alleged declarant’s alibi,
obtain an admission at a deposition, or negotiate a stipulation ahead
of trial. If nothing else, the number of witnesses needed to dispel fears
address, proxy servers and onion routing do not “guarantee anonymity” as IP addresses are not
the only means of identification online. Id.
256. Data Policy, supra note 19.
257. Robbins, supra note 7, at 34.
258. See Dean, supra note 251, at 64.
259. Dean, supra note 251, at 64.
260. Robbins, supra note 7, at 11 (“[P]ervasive posting of personal information on social-
networking sites has facilitated identity theft because hackers can obtain this information and
use it for their own gain.”).
261. Flanagan, supra note 214, at 301–03.
262. Flanagan, supra note 214, at 301–03.
263. Megan Uncel, “Facebook Is Now Friends with the Court”: Current Federal Rules and
Social Media Evidence, 52 JURIMETRICS 43, 62 (2011). Even without consulting the metadata, it
is unlikely that the account holder would fail to notice their account had been hacked. Id.
264. Dean, supra note 251, at 64; Hansen & Pratt, supra note 43, at 3.
265. Dean, supra note 251, at 64.
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of fabrication is significantly reduced.266 In short, when authorship
hinges on establishing who had control over the account in question,
location metadata may prove indispensable.267
Therefore, metadata can provide valuable circumstantial evidence
in establishing who authored a social media communication. Likewise,
metadata’s utility in verifying that the evidence accurately represents
the online content on a particular date cannot be questioned. Having
demonstrated how metadata supports these prerequisites to authenti-
cation, this Comment turns to address this method’s application under
Illinois law.
B. Best Practices for Authenticating Social Media Evidence in
Illinois
A survey of the few Illinois cases addressing the admission of social
media evidence demonstrates a general inclination to admit social me-
dia evidence.268 Overall, the more lenient Texas standard has been
gaining widespread acceptance.269 The Kent court cites Tienda with
approval, seeming to suggest that Illinois jurisprudence will follow a
less rigorous approach.270 However, the court’s reasoning demon-
strates its hesitance to trust social media evidence.271 It interprets
Tienda as requiring “something more” than a name and photograph
to authenticate social media evidence, but expressly declines to elabo-
266. Dean, supra note 251, at 64 (offering Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012) as an illustration).
267. Whether location information can be obtained is a separate and more complicated ques-
tion. See infra Part IV.A.
268. See People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (affirming that Facebook
messages were properly admitted as a business record via a certificate of authenticity provided
by a Facebook records custodian); People v. Nunn, No. 3–14–0137, 2016 WL 2866361 at *8 (Ill.
App. Ct. May 16, 2016) (finding reversible error where the trial court excluded a printout of
Facebook messages despite finding that it could be authenticated); In re Marriage of Miller, 40
N.E.3d 206, 219–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding that directing the witness to the time and origins
of Facebook status posts laid an adequate foundation for impeachment evidence); People v.
Macias, 36 N.E.3d 373, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (deferring to trial court’s discretion in admitting
pictures from a MySpace profile based on testimony from a witness with knowledge); People v.
Flores, 21 N.E.3d 1227, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (deferring to trial court’s discretion in admitting
pictures from a MySpace profile based on testimony from a witness with knowledge); Stapp v.
Jansen, 988 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (admitting printouts of messages received via
online dating applications). But cf. People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578, 587–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
(affirming that defendant’s likeness and alias were not sufficient to authenticate a Facebook
post).
269. See section titled “Texas’s Standard Gets the Most Likes” in Flanagan, supra note 214,
at 295.
270. Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 598.
271. Id. at 597–98.
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rate on what more would be sufficient.272 The resulting uncertainty
leaves Illinois practitioners guessing at what is required to introduce
social media evidence.273
Recent Illinois appellate decisions, such as Kent and Maya, do pro-
vide some implicit guidance. In dicta, the Kent court hints that
metadata would have provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to
admit a Facebook post—at least enough to submit it to the jury to
decide authorship.274 The court observed that Facebook records re-
vealing that the post originated from an IP address belonging to the
defendant’s girlfriend would have provided an adequate foundation to
argue that the defendant authored the post.275 While this observation
holds no precedential value as dicta, it endorses metadata as a reliable
method of authentication.
The reliability of Facebook records was subsequently acknowledged
in Maya.276 Although the defense challenged their admission as hear-
say rather than on authentication grounds, the appellate court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Facebook
records accompanied by a certificate of authenticity in compliance
with Rule 902(11).277 Rule 902(11) provides that business records kept
in the course of regularly conducted activity are self-authenticating.278
The certificate provided by Facebook indicated that the records were
“made and kept by the automated systems of Facebook.”279
As discussed previously, Illinois requires additional foundation re-
quirements for computer-generated business records.280 The propo-
nent must make a secondary showing as to the standardization and
accuracy of the process to indicate that the record is trustworthy and
should be admitted into evidence.281 The fact that Illinois has require-
ments beyond those provided in Rules 803(6) and 902(11) might sug-
gest that computer-generated records are subject to increased
scrutiny. The court in Kent reaffirmed these additional requirements
in a separate part of its opinion when it considered the admissibility of
phone records.282
272. Id. at 598–99.
273. Kling et al., supra note 39, at 41.
274. Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 595.
275. Id.
276. People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
277. Id.
278. Ill. R. Evid. Rule 902(11).
279. Maya, 88 N.E.3d at 31.
280. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
281. People v. Nixon, 36 N.E.3d 349, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
282. People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578, 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (citing Nixon, 36 N.E.3d at 369).
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Curiously though, it is not readily apparent that the Maya court re-
quired the secondary showing to admit the Facebook records.283 The
discrepancy between Kent and Maya is somewhat troubling, but it
may have no practical significance if Facebook’s certifications are
drafted to meet the additional requirements under Illinois law. There
is precedent allowing a proponent to show standardization and accu-
racy of the records by affidavit.284 The Maya court’s willingness to ad-
mit Facebook records as self-authenticating is significant, as it would
avoid the expense of providing an authentication witness.285
Finally, one other feature of Illinois jurisprudence in this area bears
mentioning: Recognizing the value of social media evidence, Illinois
appellate courts have found that errors in admitting, or failing to ad-
mit, social media evidence are not harmless but dispositive.286 While
social media is undoubtedly pertinent in civil litigation, it plays a sig-
nificant role in criminal prosecutions where social media communica-
tions might be admissions or otherwise bear on intent, state of mind,
or motive.287 Perhaps the prosecution’s burden of proof in criminal
trials helps to explain the more rigorous standard applied in Kent,
where the prosecution offered the evidence, versus the court’s willing-
ness to admit social media evidence in Nunn, where the defense of-
fered the evidence.288
Knowing the stakes and considering the absence of a clear standard,
attorneys “should err on the safe side and prepare to meet strict au-
thentication requirements.”289 But regardless of whether Illinois sides
with Maryland or Texas, both approaches and Illinois precedent con-
template metadata as a viable means of authentication. Authenticat-
ing using metadata is the best method to address concerns over the
accuracy of social media evidence as a representation of dynamic on-
283. See Maya, 88 N.E.3d at 31.
284. See US Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Avdic, 10 N.E.3d 339, 349–50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (admitting
computer-generated records by affidavit attached to the motion for summary judgment). But cf.
People v. Lopez, No. 1-15-0167, 2016 WL 3202022 at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (admitting com-
puter-generated records with the testimony of a witness with knowledge of the computer sys-
tem); People v. Morrow, 628 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (admitting computer-generated
records with the testimony of a witness with knowledge of the computer system).
285. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 211 (seeking to accomplish the same end by
enacting the new federal rules of evidence).
286. See Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 599 (holding that admitting the Facebook post was reversible
error); People v. Nunn, No. 3–14–0137, 2016 WL 2866361 at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. May 16, 2016)
(holding that excluding Facebook messages was not harmless error).
287. Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 439.
288. Compare Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 599 (holding that admitting the Facebook post was revers-
ible error) with Nunn, 2016 WL 2866361 at *9.
289. Kling et al., supra note 39, at 41.
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line content and provides convincing circumstantial evidence to iden-
tify who authored the content.
IV. IMPACT
While the focus of this Comment is on the use of metadata to au-
thenticate social media evidence, the argument presupposes that the
metadata is discoverable. In order to advocate for the use of metadata
as the primary means of authentication, this Comment must outline
the risks and benefits associated with collecting metadata. This part
aims to demonstrate that collecting metadata for use in authentication
is not only viable but cost-effective. The first section explains the pri-
vacy considerations associated with obtaining metadata, including the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States290 and
the controversy over the Stored Communications Act (SCA).291 The
second section engages in a cost-benefit analysis, highlighting a law-
yer’s duties under the discovery rules and professional standards. The
analysis continues by observing metadata’s utility in avoiding other
evidentiary challenges. Finally, the third section addresses how self-
authenticating electronic records fare under the Confrontation
Clause.
A. Data Privacy Considerations
The revealing nature of metadata has been a subject of controversy
ever since Edward Snowden blew the whistle on the National Security
Agency’s metadata surveillance program.292 The amount of personal
data collected by social media companies is of special concern ever
since the Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed how easily a third
party harvested data on Facebook subscribers during the 2016 presi-
dential campaign.293 Whether social media communications and the
metadata collected by social media companies should be afforded pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy continues to
be the subject of lively debate.294
290. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
291. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2012). The SCA provides that “a person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or
entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a)(1) (2012).
292. See Heller, supra note 30.
293. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore, & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consul-
tants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html.
294. See Mallory Allen & Aaron Orheim, Comment, Get Outta My Face(book): The Discov-
erability of Social Networking Data and the Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8 WASH. J. L.
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Confined to the challenges associated with authenticating social me-
dia evidence, this Comment takes no position with regard to whether
a subscriber has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her metadata.
But in contemplating whether using metadata is truly the best method
of authentication, some attention must be given to whether all liti-
gants—the Government and private parties of all means—can avail
themselves of its advantages. Therefore, this section considers the re-
cent developments in data privacy law, how social media companies
respond to discovery requests, and whether the current rules disad-
vantage criminal defendants.
Undoubtedly, the most efficient way to obtain the content of a so-
cial media page would be to request it from the user.295 But while
formal discovery requests are the best practice in civil litigation, crimi-
nal defendants are not required to disclose their social media commu-
nications to the prosecution under the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules.296 Furthermore, under the “act of production doctrine” a crimi-
nal defendant is not required to comply with a grand-jury subpoena to
produce his social media pages because such an act of production
would compromise his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination.297 Instead, both Kent and Maya specifically contemplate ob-
taining records directly from Facebook.298 But whether this strategy is
feasible in all circumstances is not immediately clear299 and deserves
discussion.
TECH. & ARTS 137 (2012); Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party
Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013); Andrew Gray, Comment, “Cloud”
Atlas-A Map to Amending Metadata Privacy Law in the Modern Era, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 147, 161
(2017); Lisa A. Schmidt, Note, Social Networking and the Fourth Amendment: Location Tracking
on Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2013).
295. Finkel, supra note 89, at 278.
296. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 413.
297. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000) (“[W]e have also made it clear
that the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena may have a compelled testimo-
nial aspect.”); see also Orin Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas? REA-
SON.COM: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/26/
does-carpenter-revolutionize-the-law-of (“The recipient can claim that complying with the sub-
poena implies certain statements – that the records exist, that the recipient has them, and that
the recipient thinks that they are authentic – and that he can’t be forced to testify against
himself.”).
298. People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d 578, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017); People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 18
(Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
299. Whether or not Facebook with respond to a request or court order to produce records
depends on what records are being sought and by whom. Compare Information for Law En-
forcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, [hereinafter Information for Law Enforcement Authorities,
FACEBOOK], https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018)
and Law Enforcement & Third-Party Matters, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., [hereinafter Law Enforce-
ment & Third-Party Matters, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.], https://www.facebook.com/help/
473784375984502 (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
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1. The Third-Party Doctrine After Carpenter v. United States
First, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United
States marked a significant shift in how the third-party doctrine is ap-
plied to ESI.300 The third-party doctrine is premised on the idea that
“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”301 Prior to Carpenter, the
third-party doctrine operated as a bright-line rule that eliminated any
Fourth Amendment privacy rights in records stored by a third-party
custodian.302 As a result, the Government could obtain records per-
taining to a criminal defendant without a warrant by simply serving a
subpoena on the third-party custodian.303
Recently, however, the Supreme Court renounced the mechanical
application of the third-party doctrine and declined to extend its ap-
plication to cell site location information (CSLI).304 In Carpenter, the
Court recognized “the deeply revealing nature of CSLI” and found
“the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not
make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”305 As a
result, the Government can no longer obtain a subscriber’s location
information from his wireless provider with a subpoena but must ob-
300. See Orin Kerr, First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, REASON.COM: VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (June 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/first-thoughts-on-car
penter-v-united-sta. Even before Carpenter, jurists and scholars had begun to challenge the
third-party doctrine’s applicability in the digital age. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring); Bedi, supra note 294, at 3.
Moreover, the continued operation of the third-party doctrine under U.S. law runs contrary to
the many protections afforded by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the Euro-
pean Union, so much so that the European Commission has adopted an EU-US Privacy Shield
to protect the data privacy rights of EU citizens. European Commission Press Release IP/16/
2461, European Commission launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: stronger protection for transat-
lantic data flows (July 12, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm.
301. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)).
302. First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, supra note 301; see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[U]ntil today—defendants categorically had no ‘reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy’ and no property interest in records belonging to third parties.”). Contra
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a subscriber had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of remotely stored emails).
303. See, for example, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012), allowing
the government to access ESI stored by third-parties through compulsory process. Note that the
standard for obtaining a subpoena is purposefully less stringent than the probable cause required
to obtain a warrant. See Justice Alito’s discussion of Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946), in his dissent to Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2254–58 (Alito, J. dissenting).
304. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this
case the Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the re-
vealing nature of CSLI.”). Cell site location information refers to the timestamped records cre-
ated each time a cell phone connects to a nearby cell tower site. See id. at 2208.
305. Id. at 2223.
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tain a warrant instead.306 More broadly, this means that the third-
party doctrine no longer operates as a categorical rule.307
Still, Chief Justice Roberts made clear that the Carpenter decision
was a narrow one, which did not “address other business records that
might incidentally reveal location information” such as a Facebook
subscriber’s IP address.308 Moreover, the Court deliberately left some
questions unanswered: “[W]e need not decide whether there is a lim-
ited period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s his-
torical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how
long that period might be.”309 Therefore, there may be room to distin-
guish Carpenter in instances where the historical location records span
fewer than seven days.310
Another question is whether data beyond location information
might fall within Carpenter’s purview.311 Likewise, it is unclear
whether Carpenter applies consistently to all forms of location data—
e.g., geotags312 embedded in social media posts and photographs. Be-
cause CSLI is automatically collected without any affirmative action
by the subscriber, the Court observed that one of the rationales un-
derlying the third-party doctrine—voluntary disclosure—is no longer
implicated.313 Consequently, the third-party doctrine does not extend
to CSLI.314 Perhaps because geotagging is typically an automatic func-
tion, such data may be an exception from the third-party doctrine. On
the other hand, posting or sharing a picture on social media is an af-
firmative action that shares location information with not just the so-
cial media provider, but with the public at large. At this point,
however, Carpenter is limited to CSLI and does not proscribe the ap-
plication of the third-party doctrine to all types of metadata.
2. The Stored Communications Act
Carpenter not only upset the traditional operation of the third-party
doctrine but also effectively abrogated the SCA with respect to
306. Id. at 2221.
307. See First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, supra note 300.
308. 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
309. Id. at 2217 n.3.
310. See First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, supra note 300. The theory is that
longer-term surveillance allows the government to gather enough bits of information to create a
mosaic of the suspect’s life in total. First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, supra note 301.
311. First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, supra note 301.
312. Geotags refer to the Exchangeable Image File Format (EXIF) data embedded in a digital
photograph that describes the time, date, and GPS coordinates of the photo. See Redlitz, supra
note 34.
313. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210.
314. Id.
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CSLI.315 Generally, the SCA permits third-party custodians to dis-
close subscriber records to law enforcement officials in response to a
subpoena.316 This is significant considering the standard to obtain a
subpoena is less stringent than the probable cause required for a war-
rant.317 In Carpenter, the Court chipped away at the constitutionality
of the SCA in ruling that “an order issued under Section 2703(d) of
the [SCA] is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-
site records.”318
While Fourth Amendment challenges to the SCA are concerned
with restricting government access to sensitive data without probable
cause, the SCA was designed as a means to prevent misuse of ESI by
private actors.319 The SCA prohibits disclosure to private entities.320
Social media providers have frequently invoked the SCA in refusing
to turn over data and have developed their own policies against
disclosure.321
But the scope of the SCA’s protection only extends to content.322
Content is defined under the statute to include “any information con-
315. Id. at 2221.
316. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). A warrant is only required for records in storage for 180
days or less. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). Disclosure of records in storage longer than 180 days
may be compelled by warrant, administrative subpoena, or court order under § 2703(d). 18
U.S.C. § 2701(a)–(b) (2012); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010).
317. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. Under § 2703(d), the government need only “‘offer[ ] spe-
cific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records
sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’” Id. at 2212 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
318. Id. at 2221. The Court’s decision in Carpenter is not the only instance in which the SCA
was ruled unconstitutional however. Similarly, in United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that “to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such emails
warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.” 631 F.3d at 288. It likewise questioned whether “the
mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a communication can[ ] be
sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 286–87 (emphasis in original).
Because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his emails, the
court held that the government may not compel the disclosure of the contents of a subscriber’s
emails absent a warrant. Id. at 288. Warshak has yet to be extended to email metadata. Gray,
supra note 295, at 161.
319. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J. dissenting) (“[T]oday, some of the greatest
threats to individual privacy may come from powerful private companies that collect and some-
times misuse vast quantities of data about the lives of ordinary Americans.”).
320. Emma W. Sholl, Exhibit Facebook: The Discoverability and Admissibility of Social Media
Evidence, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 207, 214 (2013).
321. See Law Enforcement & Third-Party Matters, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., supra note 299;
Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWITTER HELP CTR., [hereinafter TWITTER HELP CTR.], https:/
/help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support#8 (last visited Mar. 15,
2018); Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, SNAPCHAT, https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-inc/
privacy/lawenforcement.pdf (last updated Apr. 27, 2018).
322. Privacy: Stored Communications Act, ELECTRONIC FOUND. FRONTIER, https://ilt.eff.org/
Privacy__Stored_Communications_Act.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2014, 5:46 PM).
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cerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.”323
It does not include metadata.324 Several courts have ruled that be-
cause metadata is not content under the SCA, “basic subscriber infor-
mation”325 may be obtained pursuant to a civil subpoena.326 However,
this can present a significant burden considering that Facebook may
seek reimbursement for responding to requests, as permitted by
law.327 Furthermore, an out-of-state subpoena must first be domesti-
cated, or reissued by a California superior court, before it can be
served on Facebook, a California domiciliary.328 Thus, although ob-
taining basic subscriber information is not without its challenges, issu-
ing a subpoena to Facebook is still a feasible strategy to obtain
metadata (besides CSLI) with which to authenticate social media evi-
dence—for now.
3. The SCA and the Right to a Fair Trial
While Carpenter reviewed the SCA’s constitutionality under the
Fourth Amendment,329 other courts have begun to consider the crimi-
nal defendant’s disadvantage in social discovery.330 Not only does the
SCA shield the contents of electronic communications from being dis-
closed to civil litigants pursuant to a civil subpoena,331 but it also pre-
323. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012).
324. Metadata is Not Content Under the Stored Communications Act, ESI CASE LAW (Mar. 1,
2013), https://www.ilsteam.com/metadata-is-not-content-under-the-stored-communications-act.
325. Basic subscriber information is the term used by social media companies to describe non-
content or metadata. Law Enforcement & Third-Party Matters, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., supra
note 299. For instance, Snapchat describes basic subscriber information as including: the email
address, phone number, Snapchat account creation date and IP address, and timestamp and IP
address of account logins and logouts. Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 321.
326. See, e.g., Lucas v. Jolin, No. 1:15-CV-108, 2016 WL 2853576, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 16,
2016).
327. 18 U.S.C. § 2706 (2012); Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, supra
note 300.
328. See Interstate and International Depositions and Discovery Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2029.300 (West 2008); see also Law Enforcement & Third-Party Matters, FACEBOOK HELP
CTR., supra note 300 (“[T]he subpoena must be a valid federal, California or California domesti-
cated subpoena . . . .”).
329. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that the
SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is
unconstitutional.”).
330. See, e.g., Facebook v. S.C. (Touchstone), 408 P.3d 406 (Cal. 2018). Social discovery is a
term used to describe the process by which investigators and law firms search, collect, and pre-
serve information conveyed on social media platforms. See Tera Brostoff, Social Media Tools
Aren’t Just for the Police Anymore, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 2, 2016) https://www.bna.com/
social-media-tools-n57982082168/.
331. ELECTRONIC FOUND. FRONTIER, supra note 322.
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vents disclosure to criminal defendants.332 The California Supreme
Court is poised to decide whether the “statutory privacy protections
afforded a social media user must yield to a criminal defendant’s con-
stitutional rights to due process, presentation of a complete defense,
and effective assistance of counsel.”333 In Facebook v. S.C. (Touch-
stone), petitioners claim that the SCA “undermines the ability of the
defendants to put on their case,”334 especially because the social me-
dia communications of the victim are often relevant to a claim of self-
defense.335 Under the SCA, defendants, as private parties, cannot
compel social media companies to disclose the contents of non-public
communications.336 Thus, while extending Carpenter or the SCA
might grant privacy rights over metadata, it would also further disad-
vantage criminal defendants.
B. Metadata’s Utility Beyond Authentication: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis
Fortunately, subpoenaing Facebook is not the only means of ob-
taining social media evidence: a party can hire a third-party vendor to
conduct “social discovery” or collect the data themselves.337 Of
course, direct collection by a party extends to publicly-shared infor-
mation only, unless a friend of the social media user is willing to di-
vulge private communications shared with them.338 It might be
332. Andrew Cohen, How Social Media Giants Side with Prosecutors in Criminal Cases, MAR-
SHALL PROJECT (Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Andrew Cohen], https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2018/01/15/how-social-media-giants-side-with-prosecutors-in-criminal-cases.
333. California Supreme Court to Review Whether Criminal Defendant Has a Constitutional
Right to Obtain Social Media Records, ESI CASE LAW (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.ilsteam.com/
issue-whether-criminal-defendant-constitutional-right-obtain-social-media-records-electronic-
communication-service-federal-stored-communications-act-review (referring to Facebook, 408
P.3d at 406).
334. 408 P.3d at 406; Andrew Cohen, supra note 332.
335. See People v. Nunn, No. 3–14–0137, 2016 WL 2866361 at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. May 16, 2016)
(finding Facebook messages relevant to the defendant’s self-defense claim); see also Frances Ro-
bles, Judge: Zimmerman defense can go after Trayvon records, social media accounts, MIAMI
HERALD (Oct. 19, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/trayvon-mar-
tin/article1943776.html (“Defense lawyers are free to subpoena Trayvon Martin’s school records
and social media accounts, a judge ruled Friday, setting the stage for a show-down between a
man facing life in prison and new media companies that are unlikely to turn over records without
a fight.”).
336. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2012); Andrew Cohen, supra note 332.
337. See Brostoff, supra note 330.
338. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Preserving, Harvesting, and Authenticating Social
Media Evidence, 53 JUDGES J. 26, 27 (2014). Ethics rules have been interpreted to prohibit an
attorney from sending friend requests to adverse parties or witnesses, especially under false pre-
tenses. Murphy & Fontecilla, supra note 52, at 19. Here, again, “government agents are allowed
to go further than defense counsel . . . by creating fake online identities or by securing cooperat-
ing witnesses to grant them access to [private] information.” Murphy & Fontecilla, supra note 52,
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preferable to use e-discovery software or services to request the data
directly from the social media provider for a couple of reasons. First,
social media providers will only preserve account records when re-
quested by law enforcement or government agencies and even then,
only for ninety days.339 On the other hand, e-discovery software em-
ploys forensic data collection techniques to ensure that “data is pre-
served in a defensible manner.”340 Second, social media companies do
not provide authentication witnesses,341 whereas e-discovery consul-
tants are credible experts.342
The increased use of ESI in litigation has led to a robust and lucra-
tive e-discovery market.343 Although e-discovery is notorious for be-
ing expensive, it may not be as cost-prohibitive as it seems.344 The
pressure on law firms to keep litigation costs down has prompted crea-
tive and flexible pricing options.345 As a result, social discovery tools
are not just available to the Government and repeat players with deep
pockets.346 In fact, there are various open-source programs that can be
used to harvest social media data and metadata for free.347 Even if
at 7; see, e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he
Government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it accessed Colon’s Facebook profile
through a cooperating witness.”).
339. Law Enforcement & Third-Party Matters, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., supra note 299; TWIT-
TER HELP CTR., supra note 321; Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 321.
340. David Ahrens, eDiscovery Trends & Predictions for 2017, FRONTEO (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170304044621/http://www.fronteo.com/usa/ediscovery-trends-pre
dictions-for-2017/ (original URL unavailable).
341. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, supra note 300; Snapchat Law
Enforcement Guide, supra note 321.
342. Nelson & Simek, supra note 338, at 27. “[I]t really doesn’t make sense to . . . put anyone
from your firm on the stand to authenticate the evidence, particularly because your firm and
your client have a vested interest in the outcome of the case. The evidence may seem suspect.”
Nelson & Simek, supra note 338, at 27.
343. Bibart, supra note 29, at 793; “The global market for eDiscovery (Software & Services) is
projected to reach US$11.6 billion by 2020, driven by growing demand from governments and
private enterprises, rise in criminal prosecutions & civil litigations and increased admissibility of
digital data in investigational proceedings.” The Global E-Discovery (Software and Services)
Market Trends, Drivers & Projections, GLOBAL INDUSTRY ANALYSTS, INC., http://www.strategyr.
com/MarketResearch/eDiscovery_Software_and_Service_Market_Trends.asp (last visited, Mar.
13, 2018).
344. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 338, at 26 (“[T]he costs are minimal, generally several
hundred dollars.”). Some e-discovery companies “cheerfully give you . . . a free 30-day trial.”
Nelson & Simek, supra note 338, at 26.
345. Ahrens, supra note 340; For examples of low-cost alternatives see Tom O’Connor, Cost-
Effective E-discovery for Small Cases, 30 GP SOLO 1 (2013).
346. Brostoff, supra note 330; O’Connor, supra note 345.
347. Social Media Harvesting Tools, NCSU LIBR., https://www.lib.ncsu.edu/social-media-
archives-toolkit/collecting/social-media-harvesting-tools (last visited Mar. 13, 2018); Protocol for
Metadata Harvesting Tools, OPEN ARCHIVES INITIATIVE, https://www.openarchives.org/pmh/
tools/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
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there is some sticker shock, “the initial expense is likely to be out-
weighed by the future benefit.”348 For instance, a single-user license
for X1 Social Discovery software costs less than $2,000 a year before
taxes.349 To put that in perspective, a litigant will spend an average of
$35,000 in discovery costs in each federal suit and approximately half
that amount in each state suit.350 Furthermore, research shows that
the cost of discovery is proportional to what is at stake in the
litigation.351
E-discovery software tools can save time and money by automati-
cally collecting data from multiple social media accounts and across
several social media platforms.352 Unlike printing to paper or using
image capturing software, these tools capture social media content in
native format and thus preserve critical metadata.353 The software can
also insert hash values at the time of preservation, which not only
serves as a digital Bates stamp but also can be used to verify the integ-
rity of the chain of custody.354 E-discovery tools utilize location data
gathered by social media platforms to “geostream,” or perform
searches by location—for instance, collecting all of the tweets from a
designated area.355 These “geo-pinpoints can also be viewed on a
map”356 and perhaps later turned into demonstrative evidence. Fi-
348. Andrew B. Delaney & Darren A. Heitner, Made for Each Other: Social Media and Liti-
gation, 85 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N. J. 10, 14 (2013).
349. More precisely, X1 Social Discovery 5.3 costs $2,119.69. Shopping Cart, X1 SOC. DISCOV-
ERY, https://www.x1.com/products/x1_social_discovery/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (follow “Buy
Now” hyperlink).
350. Robert Hilson, How Much Does E-Discovery Cost the U.S. Every Year?, LOGIKCULL
(July 20, 2015), http://blog.logikcull.com/estimating-the-total-cost-of-u-s-ediscovery.
351. Brooke D. Coleman, The Real Cost of Litigation Reform: Justice, Not Discovery Costs,
Are at Stake, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-real-
cost-of-litigation-reform-justice-not-discovery-costs-are-at-stake (“[A Federal Judicial Center]
study found a 1 percent increase in stakes was associated with a 0.25 percent increase in total
discovery costs.”).
352. Social Media and Internet-Based Data Collection, X1 SOC. DISCOVERY, https://
www.x1.com/products/x1_social_discovery/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). “Each Collection takes a
few minutes to several hours, depending on how much you’re grabbing. You can set a schedule
for how often collections check for new posts or information.” Brett Burney, X1 Social Discov-
ery tackles social media collection in a logical fashion, LEGAL TECH NEWS (Sept. 2016), https://
www.x1.com/download/X1_Social_Discovery_LTN_Review.pdf (reviewing X1 Social
Discovery).
353. Social Media and Internet-Based Data Collection, supra note 352. Preserving data in na-
tive format and with its accompanying metadata is not only important for authentication, but a
party may be required to produce ESI and its metadata in native format pursuant to Ill. Sup. Ct.
R. 214(b), which is the functional equivalent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i).
354. See discussion supra Part III.A.1; Social Media and Internet-Based Data Collection, supra
note 352.
355. Brostoff, supra note 330; see also Burney, supra note 352.
356. Burney, supra note 352.
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nally, both the publicly available and licensed e-discovery software
products seem relatively easy to use.357
Thus, while it may seem expensive to hire an e-discovery consultant
or purchase the software needed to harvest the data in-house, the in-
vestment certainly pays off considering how valuable social media evi-
dence can be.358 Do-it-yourself methods such as taking a screenshot or
printing to paper are quickly becoming less and less viable given that
they fail to preserve the metadata.359 The remaining parts of this sec-
tion will show how failing to preserve the metadata can prove to be an
expensive mistake.360 First, the rules of discovery and a lawyer’s pro-
fessional and ethical duties promote, if not demand, the preservation
of metadata. Second, metadata’s utility extends beyond discovery and
authentication—it can be used to avoid other evidentiary objections.
1. Spoliation and Professionalism
Preserving data in native format and with its accompanying
metadata is not only important for authentication, but sometimes nec-
essary in discovery.361 The rules of discovery dictate that if a discovery
request does not specify the form, “a party must produce [ESI] in a
form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably
usable form or forms.”362 In other words, the document’s native for-
mat includes metadata.363 This is partly because metadata is used by
the recipient to search, sort, and cull documents in order to facilitate a
more efficient—and consequently less costly—review.364 Although
stripping metadata may sometimes be justified to protect client confi-
dences,365 lawyers can face sanctions for failing to preserve and pro-
357. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 338, at 26 (“Lawyers could certainly use any of the
products we’ve cited above.”); see generally Burney, supra note 352.
358. Murphy & Fontecilla, supra note 52, at 28; see also Grimm 2013, supra note 8, at 437–38.
359. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 338, at 27.
360. Keefe, supra note 6, at 1043 (observing that the failure to perform an adequate investiga-
tion and preservation of social media evidence “might make the difference between winning a
case and receiving sanctions”).
361. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 468–69.
362. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 214(a); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i).
363. Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 468–69.
364. The Sedona Conference, supra note 40, at 170.
365. See Rosenberg, supra note 153, at note 452.
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duce metadata.366 Additionally, Illinois recognizes a separate and
distinct claim for the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence.367
On the other hand, several states have weighed in on whether min-
ing the metadata of documents received from the opposing party is
ethically permissible.368 The concern is with safeguarding client confi-
dence, knowing that metadata reveals potentially devastating informa-
tion.369 Although the guidance varies greatly depending on the state,
the American Bar Association opined that litigants may review
metadata contained in documents sent from adverse parties, but they
are still obligated to notify the adverse party when there is reason to
believe the transmission was inadvertent.370 Notably, the American
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose no ex-
plicit duty to scrub a document of its metadata, but presumably, the
duty to protect confidentiality applies equally to metadata.371 Illinois
has yet to weigh in, but other states that have opined on the subject
impose a reasonable care standard.372
Furthermore, lawyers “have a duty to understand and appreciate
the potential pitfalls” of handling ESI.373 The Illinois Rules of Profes-
366. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 219 committee comment to 2002 amendment (revised May 29, 2014);
cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. When the Illinois Supreme Court Rules were updated to address the
discovery of ESI, rule 219 addressing discovery sanctions was not changed, only a comment was
added stating:
The Committee believes that the rule is sufficient to cover sanction issues as they relate
to electronic discovery. The rulings in Shimanovsky v. GMC, 181 Ill.2d 112 (1998) and
Adams v. Bath and Body Works, 358 Ill. App. 3d 387 (1st Dist. 2005) contain detailed
discussion of sanctions for discovery violations for the loss or destruction of relevant
evidence and for the separate and distinct claim for the tort of negligent spoliation of
evidence.
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 219 committee comment to 2002 amendment. However, Illinois decisions address-
ing sanctions for the loss or destruction of responsive evidence have traditionally involved
human intervention. “ESI on the other hand, can be lost simply from the routine operation of a
computer . . . . Accordingly, the issue of sanctions for the loss of ESI will present new scenarios”
for the court to address. Steven M. Puiszis, Understanding Illinois’ New Discovery Rules, http://
c.ymcdn.com/sites/iadtc.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Understanding_Illinois%27_New_.pdf
(last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
367. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 219 committee comment to 2002 amendment (revised May 29, 2014).
368. Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_
fyis/metadatachart.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) (collecting ethics opinions on the topic).
369. Id.
370. Id.; Karel Mazanec & Douglas B. Mishkin, “Mining for Metadata”: Will You Strike Gold
or Strike Out?, VENABLE LLP: LABOR & EMP. LAW TRADE SECRETS & TRANSITIONS (May 4,
2017), https://www.tradesecretsandtransitions.com/2017/05/mining-for-metadata-will-you-strike-
gold-or-strike-out/.
371. Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., supra note 368.
372. Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., supra note 368.
373. Jan L. Jacobowitz & Danielle Singer, The Social Media Frontier: Exploring A New Man-
date for Competence in the Practice of Law, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 466 (2014).
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sional Conduct mandate that “a lawyer should keep abreast of
changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks
associated with relevant technology.”374 The lawyer’s duty of compe-
tence has thus expanded to require lawyers to become familiar with
various social media platforms and e-discovery technology, and to
prepare for the challenges associated with both.375 In Lorraine, Judge
Grimm observed that “the inability to get evidence admitted because
of a failure to authenticate it almost always is a self-inflicted injury
which can be avoided by thoughtful advance preparation.”376 Merely
by adhering to the professional standards and the rules of discovery,
metadata will be preserved and can be used for authentication later.
2. Avoiding Other Evidentiary Objections
Metadata is not only useful in authenticating social media evidence
but can also be used to avoid other evidentiary objections. For in-
stance, hash values could be used to avoid an objection based on the
original writing rule.377 Timestamps and location data could prove
tweets were present sense impressions.378 In Maya, the certificate of
authenticity also served to satisfy the business record hearsay excep-
tion.379 More generally, as machine-generated information, metadata
“is not hearsay because it is not ‘statements’ of a ‘person’ under Rule
801(a).”380 Because metadata serves more than one function, litigators
can introduce social media evidence more efficiently. The process is
all the more expeditious if the metadata records are self-authenticat-
ing as business records under 902(11), or under the new federal rules
902(13) and 902(14).381 Self-authentication alleviates the need to call
and compensate an expert witness to lay a foundation.382
374. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. Prof’l Conduct r.1.1 cmt. 8 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (emphasis added).
375. See Keefe, supra note 6, at 1043.
376. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007).
377. See Rodolfo Ramirez et al., Location! Location! Location! Data Technologies and the
Fourth Amendment, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 19, 22 (explaining that duplicates are admissi-
ble so long as it accurately reflects the original).
378. See Pannozzo, supra note 3, at 1706.
379. People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
380. John M. Haried, How Two New Rules for Self-Authentication Will Save You Time and
Money, 100 JUDICATURE, Winter 2016, at 34, 39.
381. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 210.
382. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 211.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 43  7-JAN-19 10:05
2018] AUTHENTICATING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 145
C. The Right to Confrontation & the Illinois Approach to
Computer-Generated Data
As always, the concern with self-authentication is that the opponent
loses the ability to cross-examine the authenticating witness.383 This is
of particular concern in the criminal context where defendants are
guaranteed the right to cross-examine by the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.384 The Confrontation Clause is only applicable
to testimonial statements, and it is yet unresolved as to whether certif-
icates from computer forensic analysts qualify as testimonial.385 In
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court found that state-
ments prepared solely to be submitted at a criminal trial were testimo-
nial.386 However, the decision carved out a narrow exception for
records used to authenticate other documents.387 This exception could
be read to include certificates authenticating Facebook records as bus-
iness records under 902(11), or machine-generated records under
902(13), because their sole purpose is to authenticate preexisting
records.388 Since Melendez-Diaz, lower courts have uniformly found
that certifications of authenticity made pursuant to 902(11) do not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause.389 Furthermore, the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Federal Rules of Evidence notes that the new 902(13) and
902(14) fit more squarely within the Melendez-Diaz dictum.390
Melendez-Diaz has experienced a mixed reception in Illinois
courts.391 Most famously, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished
Melendez-Diaz in People v. Williams,392 which was later affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in a plurality opinion.393 Illinois
courts have continued to apply the primary purpose test narrowly,394
consistently finding Melendez-Diaz inapplicable to business records as
383. See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
384. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
385. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 218.
386. 557 U.S. at 305.
387. Id. at 322–23.
388. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 218.
389. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 219; see, e.g., United States v. Yeley-Davis,
632 F.3d 673 (10th Cir. 2011).
390. Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 220.
391. According to Westlaw, 18 of 46 Illinois cases citing Melendez-Diaz either declined to
extend its holding, declined to follow it on state law grounds, or distinguished it (last viewed Oct.
31, 2018).
392. People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 282 (2010), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Illinois, 567
U.S. 50 (2012).
393. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. at 86.
394. See People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 593 (Ill. 2012) (finding an autopsy report was a non-
testimonial business record); People v. Coleman, 24 N.E.3d 373, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (finding
IP address logs and subscriber information were non-testimonial business records); People v.
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they are not “made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a particular
criminal defendant at trial.”395 Specifically, in People v. Coleman, the
court ruled that Google IP address logs and subscriber information
were non-testimonial business records.396 However, the logs still
needed to be authenticated by a Google representative in order to be
admitted.397 Most recently in Maya, the court found that Facebook
messages could be admitted under the Rule 803(6) business record
exception to the hearsay rule.398 What is more, the court held that the
messages were self-authenticating under 902(11) and therefore, did
not require an authentication witness.399 This is convenient consider-
ing that most social media companies will not provide an authentica-
tion witness.400 It seems as though Illinois courts have and will
continue to treat metadata records as falling within the Melendez-
Diaz carve out.
But wherever courts land on the constitutional and ethical issues
discussed in these preceding sections, there is no doubt that criminal
defendants stand to benefit from a streamlined method of authenticat-
ing social media evidence.401 Metadata is equally effective at disprov-
ing the defendant is the putative author. Moreover, because errors in
admitting social media evidence are often dispositive, using metadata
Jacobs, 939 N.E.2d 64, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (finding the accuracy logbooks for a breathalyzer
non-testimonial).
395. See, e.g., Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 590 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. at 84). Even
before the Illinois Rules of Evidence were codified in 2011, § 115-5 of the Illinois Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure provided for a business record exception to the hearsay rule. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/115-5(a) (2014). Furthermore, § 115-5(c)(2) provides the exception that “[n]o writing or record
made in the regular course of any business shall become admissible as evidence . . . if . . . [s]uch
writing or record has been made by anyone during an investigation of an alleged offense or
during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation of any kind.” People v.
Universal Pub. Transp., 974 N.E.2d 251, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (quoting § 5/115-5(c)(2)). Thus,
section 115-5(c)(2) provides the statutory equivalent of the primary purpose test articulated in
Williams v. Illinois. Compare § 5/115-5(c)(2) with Williams, 567 U.S. at 84. In fact, the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that admitting drug lab reports by affidavit not only violated § 115-5(c)(2)
of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure but denied the defendant his right to confrontation in
People v. McClanahan in 2000—nine years before Melendez-Diaz was decided. See People v.
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 474, 478 (Ill. 2000).
396. 24 N.E.3d at 408.
397. Id. at 409.
398. People v. Maya, 88 N.E.3d 10, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
399. Id.
400. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, supra note 299; Snapchat Law
Enforcement Guide, supra note 321.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 330–36 (describing the criminal defendant’s disadvan-
tage in social discovery).
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effectively should reduce the number of appeals and increase judicial
efficiency.402
V. CONCLUSION
The ubiquitous use of social media in today’s society means its use
in litigation will only grow.403 As a result, attorneys must familiarize
themselves with the peculiar challenges presented by its use as evi-
dence and prepare to meet them or risk disastrous results.404 Authen-
tication arguably poses the biggest hurdle to the admission of social
media evidence, and errors committed on this issue have largely been
found to be dispositive.405 This Comment advocates for the use of
metadata as the best method of authenticating social media evidence
and argues that this method should be adopted as the standard prac-
tice in Illinois. Not only is the method endorsed by Illinois courts, and
by most courts writing on the subject,406 but using metadata to authen-
ticate is effective in rebutting the most common challenges to authen-
ticity.407 Metadata offers conclusive evidence of the accuracy of a
copy, as well as convincing circumstantial evidence of authorship.408
Moreover, collecting metadata for use in authentication is feasible,
reduces costs, and provides collateral benefits.409 Finally, although so-
cial media may generally be perceived as untrustworthy, metadata is
likely more reliable as it is machine-generated data.410 Thus, metadata
advances the basic truth-seeking function authentication was meant to
serve.411
Linda Greene
402. See Kling et al., supra note 39, at 40 (observing that failure to properly authenticate social
media evidence gives rise to arguments of error on appeal). See, e.g., People v. Kent, 81 N.E.3d
578, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
403. Margaret DiBianca, Discovery and Preservation of Social Media Evidence, A.B.A. BUS.
L. TODAY, Jan. 2014, at 1.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 362–64 (describing the potential for sanctions); see
also, supra text accompanying note 286 (observing that errors related to the authentication of
social media evidence often have a dispositive effect on the outcome of the case, which in turn
leads to overturned verdicts, potential malpractice liability, or both).
405. See Grimm 2013, supra note 8 at 437–39.
406. See, e.g., Kent, 81 N.E.3d at 598; see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 548 (D. Md. 2007); Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d
633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
407. See discussion supra Part III.A.
408. See discussion supra Part III.A.
409. See discussion supra Part IV.
410. See Reporter’s Memorandum, supra note 160, at 210–16 (explaining the rationale for
considering machine-generated information to be self-authenticating).
411. See Robbins, supra note 7, at 5.
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